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Host-based intrusion-prevention systems are recently popular technologies which 
protect computer systems from malicious attacks.  Instead of merely detecting exploits, 
the systems attempt to prevent the exploits from succeeding on the host they protect.  
This research explores the threats that have led to the development of these systems and 
the techniques many use to counter those problems.  We then evaluate two current 
intrusion-prevention products (McAfee Entercept and the Cisco Security Agent) as to 
their success in preventing exploits.  Our tests used live viruses, worms, Trojan horses, 
and remote exploits which were turned loose on an isolated two-computer network.   We 
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I. HOST-BASED INTRUSION PREVENTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
In the beginning, system administrators were concerned with maintaining a 
functioning computer network.  The security of that network from attacks, viruses, and 
other exploits, was considered secondary; the primary concern was keeping the network 
running.  In recent years these two considerations have begun to merge.  Many system 
administrators now acknowledge that to keep the network running, security must be a 
primary consideration.  Tools such as firewalls, which allow only certain external-
network traffic to reach the internal network, and intrusion-detection systems, which 
monitor network traffic for malicious activity, have become increasingly important. 
In the past, traditional network-security arrangements have placed the 
responsibility for intrusion prevention on the firewall alone.  The firewall would allow 
only certain traffic, as specified by policy, to pass through from the Internet to the 
internal network.  Traditional intrusion-detection-systems merely analyzed those packets 
that were allowed through and examined them for unauthorized or malicious content.  If 
unauthorized content was detected, these systems merely raised an alarm while allowing 
potential exploits to damage the target system(s).  In recent years computer security has 
moved away from this traditional “warn only” approach. Host-based Intrusion-Prevention 
Systems (HIPS) are recently popular technologies which function more as active 
protectors than passive observers.   
The primary goal of this research is to evaluate the idea behind host-based 
intrusion-prevention systems.  Are the systems useful? Are they worth the added expense 
of purchase and management? The second goal is to make recommendations, based on 
the results of our testing, regarding the purchase of these products by the Department of 
Defense.  This thesis presents the results of evaluations of two such products, McAfee 
Entercept and Cisco Security Agent.   
Recent widespread attacks such as the Sasser and MSBlast worms, which may 
have infected up to 10 million computers (Lemos, 2004), have shown how vulnerable 
current networks are to certain attacks.  Such attacks no longer require users to open 
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email attachments; users put their systems at risk simply by connecting to the Internet 
with a vulnerable system.  Such threats show that a reliance on signature-based intrusion-
detection systems and network-based protection measures such as firewalls, is 
inadequate.  More must be done to protect network infrastructure from exploitation. 
The time between an exploit release and a vulnerability announcement, the 
“vulnerability threat window” (Beighton, 2004), is shrinking.  Where vendors once had 
months to create and disseminate a patch to correct a vulnerability, they now often have 
only a few days.  In January 2003, the Slammer worm “attacked a vulnerability that was 
discovered six months earlier (Moulton, 2004)”; Sasser struck in May 2004, just 18 days 
after the vulnerability announcement (Symantec Small Business, 2005).  According to 
Symantec “during the first six months of 2004 the average time between the public 
disclosure of a vulnerability and the release of an associated exploit was 5.8 days 
(Sevounts, 2004).”  This shrinking of the vulnerability threat window emphasizes the 
need for agents based on behavioral rules that act immediately to offer some possibility 
of protection against these emerging threats.   
This thesis will discuss the concepts behind host-based intrusion-prevention 
systems, our testing procedures and results, and our analysis and recommendations based 




II. INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREVENTION 
A.  NETWORK VERSUS HOST-BASED PROTECTION 
1. Network-based 
Network-based intrusion-detection and intrusion-prevention systems involve one 
or more sensors that are responsible for monitoring the entire network (Beale, 2004).  
There are three common types of network-based systems.  The first, and the most 
common, involves placing sensors into the network architecture to allow the system's 
Network Interface Card (NIC) to see all traffic on the network (promiscuous mode).  
Such systems passively monitor the network traffic.  Another less common architecture 
requires the system to function much as a router ("inline" mode).  All traffic entering and 
leaving the network passes through it and can be blocked or modified by it.  The “pass-
through” design requires a greater investment in resources, processing power, and time 
by the system administrators.  A third type involves a single sensor node protecting a 
single computer ("host-based" mode) although it is situated on a network.  The sensor 
sees only the packets bound for that specific computer (Proctor, 2001).  Snort and Stealth 
Watch are two well know network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). 
2. Host-based 
Host-based systems only monitor a single computer from within that computer.  
They are responsible for monitoring only the traffic that reaches their host (Beale, 2004).  
Host-based systems can be managed locally from the host computer, or remotely from a 
server running the management software.  Both products tested as part of this thesis were 
host-based and use a management server to configure and communicate with individual 
host agents.  Both products’ managers are capable of managing several thousand host 
agents from a single server. 
 
B. HEADER/PROTOCOL INSPECTION VERSUS PAYLOAD INSPECTION 
 Whether network or host-based, an intrusion-detection or intrusion-prevention 




1. Header/Protocol Inspection 
Header/protocol Inspection is limited to checking information in a packet’s 
headers. This includes such information as the source and destination IP address and what 
flags have been set.  Header inspection requires little time and processing power and is 
often selected when an agent’s impact on network throughput is of concern.  Both of the 
products tested in this research include a host firewall that employs this method of 
inspection.   
2. Payload Inspection 
Payload inspection examines the contents of network packets.  This level of 
examination typically involves “signature matching” wherein the agent searches for 
known strings of malicious code.  This type of inspection is more thorough and effective 
in identifying a computer attack or exploit. 
3. Decoded Packets 
A third option is to do inspection at a higher level, after the packet is decoded.  
The agent does not inspect the individual packets; instead, it inspects the interpretation of 
those packets by the operating system.  This prevents many common network-based 
obfuscation techniques such as packet fragmentation.  Both of the products tested in this 
research employ this method of inspection. 
 
C. STATEFUL VERSUS STATELESS PACKET INSPECTION 
Agents can monitor traffic in two ways: statelessly or statefully. A stateless 
system is limited to making decisions based solely upon currently available information. 
A stateful system uses memory or other knowledge of previous activities that contributes 
to the quality of the decisions made. Stateful packet inspection generally requires the 
security system to remember recent events in a session.  A network-based system must 
remember all of the sessions currently instantiated.  This inspection requires more time, 
processing power, and memory, but is more effective in identifying computer exploits 





D. DETECTION VERSUS PREVENTION 
When the agent does identify an exploit it can respond in one of two ways.  
1. Detection 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) merely identifies and/or alerts on discovery 
of an exploit.  Such systems often alert the network administrator to the exploit detection 
but take no action on their own.  This lack of action has some computer security experts 
publicly stating that Intrusion Detection Systems are a dead technology (Messmer, 2003).  
However, this same lack of action also reduces the effect of false positives on the 
network.   
2. Prevention 
An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) identifies and tries to stop the exploit 
before it can execute on the target computer in addition to notifying the administrator.  
Many protection systems, including both of those evaluated as part of this thesis, can be 
used in intrusion-detection-only mode should the administrator choose.  This feature 
allows administrators more flexibility. 
Both agent types, detection and prevention, typically offer the administrator 
different levels of protection.  If the network is under attack, the administrator can 
increase the level of protection. However, increased protection comes at the price of 
raising the ratio of false positives (false alarms) to false negatives (successful exploits). In 
the case of a protection system such an increase can introduce self-inflicted denial of 
service problems.  
 
E. SIGNATURE VERSUS BEHAVIOR BASED DETECTION 
Current monitoring systems fall into four main categories with regard to how 
recognition of exploits is achieved: signatures, behavior, combinations, and anomalies.   
1. Signatures 
Signature-based systems use a database of known attack signatures to identify 
potential exploits.  In order for these systems to work, exploits must be identified by 
some other means first to have their signatures isolated and disseminated.  During the 
period between the release of the exploit and the dissemination of its signature, any 
network protected exclusively by a signature-based system is vulnerable to that exploit.  
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If a new variant of that exploit is released that does not match the exact signature, the 
process must begin again.  And a non-malicious program that matches the signature is 
falsely identified by the system as an exploit.    
2. Behavior 
Agents based on behavioral rules use a database of rules that describe normal 
behavior.  Any program that violates these rules of behavior is identified by the agent as 
an exploit.  Because the systems rely on a pattern of behavior (such as a sequence of 
commands) rather then an exact signature, they do not require an exploit to first be 
identified and a signature disseminated.  Such systems offer protection against some 
exploits that have not been invented yet, referred to as “zero-day” protection. Systems 
based on behavioral rules do not require the frequent updates that signature-based 
systems do; however, they still require some updates as exploits change their behavior 
with time in order to avoid detection.  The Cisco Security Agent relies on such behavioral 
rules.  Systems based on behavior rules cannot provide an exact identification of an 
exploit used against them, just a category. 
3. Combinations 
Combination systems use both attack signatures and behavioral rules.  Such 
systems offer the “zero-day” protection of a behavior-based system while also providing 
the attack recognition of a signature-based system.  McAfee Entercept is a combination 
system. 
4. Anomalies 
Anomaly-based systems are typically used as network intrusion-detection 
Systems.  The systems compare current network traffic with typical (baseline) network 
traffic and locate any statistical anomalies (deviations from baseline) (Stallings, 2003).  
Sufficiently anomalous traffic is identified as a possible exploit. 
 
F. SUBVERTING SIGNATURE-BASED SYSTEMS 
Two options exist for circumventing signature-based monitoring systems.  The 
first is to use an exploit that does not have a signature.  This can be done by creating a 
new exploit or by modifying an old exploit so that the signature no longer matches.  This 
option requires some expertise and time, and only a few attackers can provide this. 
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The second option against network-based agents is to modify the protocol in such 
a way that the system cannot see the entire signature of a known exploit as one 
observable string.  A recent paper (Rubin, 2004) discussed a program called AGENT 
(Automatic Generation for Network Intrusion Detection System Testing tool) that 
"mutated" the sequences of several known attacks and tested against Snort, a well-known 
signature-based network intrusion-detection system.  The mutations included 
fragmentation, retransmission, and header changes.  For each attack attempted the 
researchers could generate at least one mutated session that Snort did not detect.  But this 
approach is less likely to succeed against a host-based system.   
 
G. SUBVERTING NETWORK-BASED SYSTEMS 
Ptacek and Newsham (Ptacek, 1998) argue that current network-based systems 
are inherently flawed in three ways.   
1. Insertion 
One kind of attack relies on the monitoring system accepting a packet that the 
victim computer rejects.  Because of differences in how different computers handle 
different Internet packets, it is not difficult to create such a packet.   Such packets could 
include malformed or incorrect header information and improper fragmentation.  When 
the intrusion-detection system examines the session it does not detect the exploit because 
of the camouflage; however, the victim computer rejects the inserted packet and is 
successfully exploited. 
 Unless the network segment being monitored by the system is completely 
homogenous or incredibly small, it is not possible to configure it to reject every packet 
the victim computer rejects because that would require ultimately executing the code 
itself.  Determining whether code is safe is an undecidable problem similar to the 
undecidable "Halting Problem" for automata. 
2. Evasion 
Evasion relies on the monitoring system rejecting a packet that the victim 
computer ultimately accepts (the exact opposite of insertion).  When the intrusion-
detection system examines the session no known attack signatures are found, while the 
victim computer is successfully exploited.  This type of attack is only effective against 
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systems that rely on passive analysis of network traffic.  Since the monitoring system is 
merely eavesdropping on the network it cannot prevent the victim computer from 
accepting the same packet that it rejected; while a system that monitors “in-line” would 
be able to discard the rejected packet, thereby preventing it from reaching the host system 
3. Denial of Service 
A third means of subversion involves a denial-of-service attack against the 
monitoring system itself.  This attack is particularly effective against systems that rely on 
passive analysis, but could also function against others.  If the attacker can crash the 
monitoring system, it will not be able to monitor network traffic.  If the system “fails 
open”, the unmonitored traffic continues to flow to and from the network leaving it 
vulnerable to exploit.  A system designed to “fail closed” would cause a self-inflicted 
denial of service, though it would halt any attempt to exploit the network. 
4. Insider Threats 
A fourth vulnerability of network-based monitoring systems is their potential to 
miss exploits conducted by someone inside the network.  If the system monitors only the 
external network, it cannot detect exploits launched from one computer to another across 
















III. ADVANTAGES OF HIPS PROTECTION 
A. ADVANTAGES AT THE NETWORK LEVEL 
1. Defense in Depth 
Two lines of defense are always preferable to one in warfare, cyber or otherwise.  
Host-based intrusion-prevention systems add an additional layer of protection beyond 
network-based ones.  This added layer of protection increases the chances of stopping an 
attacker before he can successfully exploit any computers on a network. The remaining 
unexploited computers are still protected and must be individually exploited increasing 
the chances his attacks will be detected. 
2. Reduced Perimeter Dependence 
Traditional network security architectures call for a perimeter, or boundary, to 
separate segments of the network from the Internet and from one another.  As you move 
further into the proprietary network and further away from the public Internet, the access 
controls between network segments generally increases (become increasingly 
selective/restrictive).  This traditional architecture works well on any network that can be 
divided into segments with well-defined perimeters.  However, as the U.S. Department of 
Defense moves increasingly towards "network-centric" operations and the architecture 
known as the Global Information Grid, this type of network architecture will no longer be 
possible.  The Global Information Grid “will provide authorized users with a seamless, 
secure, and interconnected information environment (National Security Agency, 2005)” 
as a world-wide, dynamic, ad-hoc network.  The network will contain everything from 
hand-held computing devices carried by Marines in the field, to ship-based servers 
supporting an entire carrier battle-group. The burden of protection will move increasingly 
to the edge of the network and be borne by each individual host. Host-based Intrusion-
Prevention Systems offer administrators an effective means of protecting those hosts. 
3. Distributed Sensors 
 Each host-based agent of a host-based intrusion-prevention system acts as a 
sensor on the network.  This feature provides the network much greater capability for 
detecting and preventing attacks.  Instead of receiving data from a few strategically 
located sensors on the network, the administrator receives it from every host.  Even if an 
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attacker is able to circumvent parts of the network, they will not be able to evade the 
host-based protection located on each individual system. 
 
B. ADVANTAGES AT THE HOST LEVEL 
1. Protection against Local Threats 
Host-based intrusion-prevention systems protect the host from any malicious 
activity, not just network based malicious activity.  A network-based protection system 
cannot prevent a user from executing local attacks such as privilege escalation, whereas a 
host-based system can. 
2. Centralized Management 
Usually a host-based intrusion-prevention system’s management server allows an 
administrator to configure and manage all host-based agents remotely.  The management 
server allows the administrator to view all alerts for the network.  Malicious-activity 
reports can include detailed forensics information about the alert, allowing the 
administrator to evaluate if the host was actually attacked. 
3. Tailored Protection 
Host-based agents allow the administrator to tailor protection to each individual 
host.  These configurations can be handled in groups, such as all email servers or all 
remote users, or by individual hosts.  Such an architecture can provide greater protection 
for mobile hosts, and more consistent protection for ad-hoc wireless networks, networks 
wherein the perimeter is difficult to establish and changing often.  
 
C. ADVERTISED HIPS FUNCTIONALITY 
Two commercially available host-based intrusion-prevention systems were 
evaluated as part of this research.  Each product advertises a number of functional 
features. 
1. McAfee Entercept 
Information described in this section was obtained from the Entercept 5.0 
Evaluation Guide.  We do not specifically endorse or deny any claim found in this 
section.  Our own results can be found in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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MacAfee Entercept claims to use a combination of behavioral rules, attack 
signatures, and a process firewall to protect against “known and unknown malicious 
activity including, but not limited, to worms, Trojan horses, buffer overflow attacks, 
malformed commands, critical system file modifications and privilege escalation 
(McAfee, 2005)”.  To provide this protection, Entercept inserts itself into the system-call 
chain, using a kernel level driver, and redirects the entries in the system-call table to the 
Entercept driver.  It is then able to intercept “select system calls and API calls before the 
OS executes them (McAfee, 2005)”.  When an application requests a file, Entercept 
checks the request against its behavioral rules and signatures and only allows those 
requests that it deems to be non-malicious. 
The process firewall, available only for Windows platforms, gives administrators 
the ability to control traffic to and from individual systems.  They can create firewall 
rules that control access to network resources.  These rules can be configured as 
incoming, outgoing, or both.  The firewall also includes a network engine and a set of 
signatures that inspect for exploits in the communications layer.  If a malicious packet is 
detected, the “network engine discards it before it is processed by the TCP/IP 
[Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol] stack (McAfee, 2005).”  Any alerts 
generated by the firewall are reported to the management server. 
Entercept’s hybrid approach allows it to claim to prevent both known and zero-
day (previously unknown) attacks.  Instead of merely preventing an exploit from 
propagating, Entercept’s hybrid approach allows it to prevent it from compromising the 
service.  Then the host system does not need to be rebooted, thus preventing any denial of 
service.  The hybrid approach also lowers the number of false alarms generated by the 
host agents, with the behavioral rules minimizing false positives while the signature 
database minimizes false negatives.  Entercept’s protection against zero-day attacks 
“reduces the need for immediate patch deployment—enterprises can deploy patches after 
careful research and testing… (McAfee, 2005)”. 
Entercept’s comprehensive protection also includes buffer overflow protection.  It 
claims patented technology that protects the host by preventing code executions resulting 
from buffer overflows.  Entercept protects system resources by “locking down critical 
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system resources (specific system files, settings, registries keys, services, etc.) (McAfee, 
2005)”.  Protection against privilege escalation prevents attacks from gaining root-level 
privileges.   Entercept can also provide detailed forensic information about an exploit. 
The management server and the management console allow the administrator to 
quickly and easily view all alerts and attacks, configure the host agents, and perform data 
analysis.  The management server can control up to 10,000 agents.  The management 
server also allows the users of the host agents to create their own firewall and behavioral 
rules as necessary. 
Entercept agents are available in four variants: standard edition, Web-server 
edition, database-server edition, and a Web/database combination.  Standard editions are 
available for Windows, Solaris, and HP-UX operating systems.  Web-server editions are 
available for IIS 4, IIS 5, IIS 6, Apache 1.3.6 and higher, Apache 2.0.42 and higher, 
iPlanet 4.0 and 4.1, and Sun ONE 6.0.  Database-server editions are available for 
Microsoft SQL server 2000 only.   
2. Cisco Security Agent 
Information in this section was obtained from the Cisco Security Agent version 
4.5 Data Sheet.  We do not specifically endorse or deny any claim found in this section.  
Our own results can be found in chapter 5 of this thesis. 
The Cisco Security Agent uses behavioral rules to proactively defend its host 
computer from damage through all five phases of an attack.  It is designed specifically to 
thwart attacks with no known signature.  The Cisco Security Agent also provides “host 
intrusion prevention, a distributed firewall, malicious mobile code protection, operating 
system integrity assurance, and audit log consolidation; all within a single agent (Cisco 
2005)”. 
Cisco identifies five key phases to a computer attack. The first is the Probe or 
reconnaissance phase, during which the attack gathers as much data as possible about the 
target computers and their network’s topology.  Next, during the Penetration phase, the 
attacker utilizes exploits such as buffer overflows and email attachments to gain access to 
a targeted system.  During the third, or Persistent phase, the attacker installs back doors 
and updates system registries to allow her access to the computer at a later date.  During 
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the fourth, or Propagate, phase the attacker extends control to other computer systems on 
the network.  The fifth and final phase, Paralyze, involves the attacker disrupting services 
on the targeted network.   
The Agent resides between the application and kernel level of the host system.  
Cisco claims this architecture minimizes the impact on the stability of the operating 
system and allows the agent to intercept all system calls to file, network, and registry 
sources, as well as to dynamic run-time resources such as memory pages and shared 
library modules (Cisco, 2005).  The behavior of the intercepted calls is correlated with 
other calls and evaluated against a set of rules that define acceptable behavior.  Decisions 
about whether to allow or deny these system calls are then made in real time.  Since 
protection is based on blocking malicious behavior, the agent blocks both known and 
unknown attacks without requiring updates.  Correlation of system-call behavior is 
performed on both the host agent and the management server, thus allowing the system to 
effectively identify and block malicious host-based activity and global attacks such as 
network worms or distributed scans. 
The management server is accessed through a Web-browser interface and requires 
“Cisco Works” in addition to the management-server software.  A single management 
server can control up to 20,000 agents.  However, using the provided installation guide, 
three servers can control up to 100,000 agents.  All alerts generated by the agents are 
reported to the management server.  If an agent is disconnected from the management 
server at the time an alert is generated it stores the alert and reports it to the server when 
connection is reestablished.  If contact with the management server is lost for any reason, 
all agents will continue to function at the last defined protection level, allowing remote 
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IV. TEST SETUP AND METHODOLOGY 
A. METRICS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. False Negatives 
One useful metric is the number of false negatives (missed attacks).  In order to 
measure these metrics we used two remote penetration tools and a number of malicious 
code exploits.  The actual exploits used in this research are listed in section C of this 
chapter.  
a. Core Impact 
A successful Core Impact exploit installs a level zero agent on the victim 
computer.  A “level zero agent” is specific to Core Impact.  It returns administrator level 
privileges to the attacking computer.  Once a level zero agent has been uninstalled it 
leaves no trace on the victim computer.  The exploits were allowed to run until Core 
Impact reported success or failure.  The management server was then checked for any 
alerts. 
b. Metasploit 
A successful Metasploit exploit performs a number of payload actions as 
specified by the user.  Two payloads were used for this thesis: “Add User” which adds an 
administrative user to the victim computer, and “Win Bind” which returns a command 
shell from the victim computer to the attacker.  The exploits were allowed to run until 
they reported success or failure.  The management server was then checked for any alerts. 
c. Malicious Code Installation 
Three types of malicious code were used in this research: viruses, worms, 
and Trojan horses.  A successful malicious-code exploit either spawns a process on the 
victim machine and that process continues to run until manually stopped, or the process 
causes some noticeable action on the victim machine that could only be attributed to the 
exploit.  Noticeable actions include, but are not limited to, mass mailing, self-deletion, 
and the creation of new files on the victim machine.  These exploits were allowed to run 
for approximately two minutes, unless the process started by the exploit was still running.  
IF the process continued to run it was given another two minutes.  Processes were  
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monitored through the windows “Task Manager”.  After the allotted time, the 
management server was checked for any alerts and any still-running processes were 
halted.    
2. False Positives 
Another useful metric is the number of false positives (normal activities 
erroneously identified as malicious).  An event was deemed to be a false positive if an 
alert was generated by the agent that was not caused by an exploit or malicious code test.  
There were no specific tests aimed at eliciting false positives, however we kept a record 
of any that occurred in the course of our tests for overall product evaluation purposes.  
3. Impact on Protected System Throughput 
 While there were no metrics designed to measure the effect on system throughput, 
we were able to make some general observations based on the amount of time required 
by the agent to perform a given task.  Tasks included things like loading the management 
server and opening programs such as the Web browser used during the testing of the 
software.  
 
B. TEST LAB SETUP, CONFIGURATION AND RATIONALE 
1. Topology and Component Selection 
Two computers were used to perform the tests.  The computers were networked 
together using a crossover cable; no other network connections were used.  This 
configuration allowed us to use live exploits without fear of accidental infection of other 
computers on the network.  This configuration also isolated our computers from non-test 
network activities and traffic.  One computer, Inside, was used as the victim machine 
throughout the testing.  The other computer, Outside, served as the management server 
for the HIPS agent, the attacking computer, and the email server. 
2. Computer Configuration 
The victim computer--Inside--used the Microsoft Windows 2000 Advance Server 
Service Pack 0 operating system.  We also installed SQL 2000 and IIS 5.0.  These service 
packs and versions were purposely chosen because they are out of date. This ensured a 
large number of possible vulnerabilities.  We used Norton Ghost to create an image of the 
victim machine.  This image was used to restore the victim machine as necessary to its 
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original baseline configuration. After restoration, the agent currently being tested was 
reloaded onto the machine as required to continue the testing with remaining exploits. 
The attacking computer--Outside--also used the Microsoft Windows 2000 
Advanced Server operating system.  Service packs were only installed as required by the 
HIPS management server.  McAfee Entercept required service pack 2.  Cisco Security 
Agent required service pack 4.  Core Impact and Metasploit were also installed onto 
Outside in order to conduct remote exploits.  We also installed an email server on 
Outside.  No aspects of the email server itself were tested; it was merely used to send 
exploits from our attacker to the victim machine. 
3. Configuration Profile of both Test HIPS 
McAfee Entercept version 4.056 was tested at Level 2 Protection as defined by its 
management console.  All high and medium alerts were blocked by the agent and logged 
by the management server.  All exploits identified as false negatives were then tested a 
second time at Level 3 Protection as defined by the management console.  Level 3 
Protection blocks all high, medium, and low alerts and logs all high, medium, low and 
information alerts with the management server.  During the reconnaissance phase the 
firewall was tested both in warning mode and protection mode. 
Cisco Security Agent version 4.5 was tested at the medium security level as 
defined by the host agent.  All exploits identified as false negatives were then tested a 
second time at the high security level as defined by the host agent.  The predefined rule 
modules “all servers” and “IIS servers” were enforced on Inside.    
4. Identification and Isolation of Control Variables 
To check that all of the exploits worked properly, we first tested them against an 
unprotected image of the victim machine.  Since all the exploits did work under these 
circumstances, any exploit that failed to infect/penetrate Inside after the protective agent 
was installed was logically assumed to be attributable to the success of the Intrusion 
Prevention System. 
5. Assumptions and Limitations of Test 
Neither agent was tested against an incoming threat from a peer-to-peer program 
such as ICQ or Kazaa.  It was decided that installing and configuring our own peer-to-
peer program would be too difficult and time consuming for this research. 
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 Effects on system throughput were not tested as part of this research.  Such tests 
were beyond our scope due to the large number of computers required.  Future work in 
this area is recommended. 
 
C. TESTING PHASES 
As discussed earlier, the first step in many hacker attacks is reconnaissance of the 
target system and the network it resides on.  Thus, the first phase of our testing involved 
evaluating the agent’s ability to thwart a potential attacker’s reconnaissance efforts.  
Success in this area may be considered security through obscurity, but we should not 
disregard its potential value.  Decreasing the amount of information a hacker can easily 
gather about a network reduces their chances of success. Early awareness of 
reconnaissance activity may also provide the target system’s owner with valuable lead 
time with which to employ additional protective/deterrence measures.  
The remaining phases of testing involved evaluating the agent’s ability to block 
an exploit once it has been launched.  While many exploits can be used against a 
computer, almost all fall into one of five main categories: remote, email, Web-page, disk, 
and peer-to-peer.  For this evaluation we tested exploits in the remote, email, Web-page, 
and disk categories.  For each of these four categories, twelve attacks were used, for a 
total of forty-eight total test cases.   
The exploits were chosen to cover as broad a range as possible and included 
worms, Trojan horses, and viruses.  We tried to select as equal a ratio as possible from 
each category.  However, after our tests against an unprotected system a large number of 
our selected Trojan horses were eliminated because they did not meet our standards of 
success.  Additionally, although neither product claimed to stop viruses, we wanted to see 
how they would perform against them.  Exploits were also chosen with regard to age, we 
did not want all of our exploits to be very old or very new, we tried to choose a number 
of new and old exploits.  If we chose only very new exploits we would not know if the 
products still blocked older well known exploits.  If we chose only very new exploits we 
would not know if the products were effective against new exploits.  Thus a mix of 
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exploits was chose, some old and some new.  The remote exploits chosen attacked a 
number of different services as well as core Windows components.   
We divided the evaluations into five phases, one phase for each category, and the 
reconnaissance phase.  Each phase of testing was completed for each exploit before 
moving on to the next phase.  Exploits are listed below in the order in which they were 
tested during both evaluations.  The testing procedure is given in Appendix A. 
1. Reconnaissance  
 The reconnaissance phase was conducted using Super Scan 4.  The scans were 
conducted from Outside to Inside.  McAfee Entercept was tested twice, once with the 
firewall in protection mode, and once with the firewall in warning mode.  Warning mode 
still generated alerts but did not block malicious behaviors.  Cisco security agent was 
tested once.  The tests was conducted only once against Cisco Security Agent because we 
could not find a way to disable the firewall capability without disabling the agent itself.  
The tests were also carried out against an unprotected system for comparison purposes. 
2. Remote Exploits 
The remote-exploit phase was conducted using Core Impact and Metasploit.  The 
exploits were launched from Outside against Inside.  The following exploits Core-Impact 
exploits were evaluated:   
IIS CGI Filename Decode 
IIS Unicode 
IIS IDS-IDQ 
SQL Server Hello 
MSRPC DCOM 
SQL Server CAN-2002-0649 
IIS ASN.1 Big String SpNeGo 
MSRPC LSASS Buffer Overlow 
The following Metasploit exploits were evaluated: 
iis_nsiislog_post – win bind payload 
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iis50_printer_overflow – win bind payload 
iis50_webdav_ntdll – win bind payload 
msrpc_dcom_ms03_026 – add user payload 
3. Email Exploits 
For the email phase, an email with an attached exploit was generated on Outside 
and sent to Inside via the email server.  Microsoft Outlook Express was then used to view 
the message on Inside and attachments were opened.  The malicious code was then 













4. Web Page Exploits 
For the Web-page phase, a Web page was created on Outside that hosted the 
exploit. Using the Web browser Internet Explorer on Inside, we browsed to the page and 
executed the exploit.  Internet Explorer provides two options for downloading and 
executing Web-based content, “run this program from its current location”, and “save this 
program to disk”, and we tested both.    The following exploits were evaluated: 













5. Disk Exploits 
For the disk phase, the exploit was placed on a 3.5” floppy disk.  The disk was 

















D. EXPLOIT CODE EMPLOYED 
1. Malicious versus Non-Malicious Code 
Because both systems rely at least partially on behavioral rules as a means of 
detecting exploits, only complete examples of malicious code were used in this research.  
Simulated malicious code may contain the complete signature, but by its very nature it 
does not mimic all of the characteristic behaviors of malicious code.  However, complete 
malicious code is dangerous and must be used only in an isolated environment such as 
ours.   
2. Malware Code Source 
The Netbus Trojan was downloaded from Hackers Playground (Hackers 
Playground, 2001).  All other virus, Trojan, and worm exploits were obtained from or 
created with tools available on VX Heavens (VX Heavens, 1999).  Worm One and Worm 
Two were created specifically for this research using the P0ke’s Worm Generator.  
Malicious code names listed in this thesis are as they appear on VX Heavens.   
3. Remote Exploit Code Source 
Core Impact is a commercially available automated penetration testing tool.  Core 
Impact version 4.0.1 was used for this research.  It can be purchased from Core Security, 
<http://www.coresecurity.com>. 
Metasploit is an open-source penetration-testing tool available over the Internet.  
The Metasploit framework version 2.3 was used for this research.  Metasploit can be 
downloaded from the Metasploit project homepage, <http://www.metasploit.com>. 
4. Reconnaissance Testing Code Source   
Super Scan is a Transmission Control Protocol port scanner.  Super Scan version 




E. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING TESTING 
1. McAfee Entercept 
Two special problems were encountered while testing McAfee Entercept.  The 
first occurred after I locked both computers rather then shutting them down for the night.  
On the next day the management server was no longer able to communicate with the 
agents.  I then attempted to reinstall the management server but was unable to because 
Entercept’s agent is self-protecting.  The agent on the management-server computer 
would not allow the management server to be uninstalled since it was in protection mode.  
Because the management server could no longer connect to the agent I could not take it 
out of protection mode to perform the reinstall.  After several attempts I was able to 
successfully uninstall both the agent and the management server by restarting the 
computer in safe mode.  However, this did not allow the management server to properly 
uninstall the database.  As a result, when I attempted to reinstall the management server I 
encountered numerous server-agent consistency errors.  After manually deleting the 
database, registry values, and other files associated with the database I was able to 
successfully reinstall the management server.  To ensure this problem did not happen 
again I properly shut down both computers at the conclusion of each day and did not put 
the agent on the management server in protection mode.  Leaving the management server 
unprotected did not affect our test results, but it is not recommended for real world 
operations. 
The second problem occurred after Entercept testing was completed.  While 
attempting to uninstall the management server and database I mistakenly uninstalled the 
database first.  When the management server tried to uninstall, several errors occurred as 
it tried to uninstall the database.  After several attempts I decided to simply delete the 
management server manually rather then asking it to uninstall itself.  To avoid this 
problem, I recommend uninstalling the management server first followed by all traces of 
the database that remain. 
2. Cisco Security Agent 
Two special problems were encountered while testing Cisco Security Agent.  The 
first occurred during our initial installation.  At some point during our testing several of 
the Windows Operating system files on Outside were corrupted.  This corruption did not 
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affect Outside in any way, and went completely unnoticed until we attempted to install 
the Cisco Security Agent management server.  When the management server is installed a 
Microsoft SQL 2000 database is installed on the computer hosting the management 
server.  Because of the corrupted files this database was not installed correctly.  However, 
we did not know about the corrupted files and thought the incorrectly installed database 
was the problem.  Eventually with the help of some tech support from Cisco we 
discovered that the bad database was a symptom of the problem and not the actual 
problem.  Once a new version of windows was installed the installation of Cisco Security 
Agent proceeded without any further difficulties. 
The second problem also occurred during installation.  During the course of our 
testing it was necessary on several occasions to return Inside to its baseline configuration.  
This was accomplished using a previously compiled image of Inside.  After the image 
was restored we then reinstalled the Cisco Security Agent host agent on Inside.  After the 
installation the computer rebooted and attempted to register with the management server.  
Unfortunately, the agent was unable to do so.  After numerous restarts, and other attempts 
to register the host agent with the management server it would eventually register.  We 
was not satisfied with how long it took the agent to register and attempted to discover 
why it would not register immediately after restart.  The agent log file listed a specific 
error number, unfortunately for us we did not know what that number meant.  After about 
half an hour of testing we discovered the problem was caused by the management server 
already containing a host agent named Inside.  If this host was deleted from the 
management server the registration proceeded without a problem.  If the host record was 
not deleted it took the management server several minutes to recognize that this was in 











V. TEST RESULTS 
A. RECONNAISSANCE PHASE 
The Reconnaissance Phase testing was conducted using SuperScan 4.0.    
SuperScan can be used by both administrators and hackers.  It provides the user with 
information about the individual hosts on the network and is a useful tool for those 
attempting to attack or defend a computer network.  The first test was a normal port scan 
using SuperScan’s default settings.  The second was a Windows Enumeration Scan using 
SuperScan’s default settings.  
Seventeen different tests provided by SuperScan were evaluated. The first three 
tests (TCP Ports, UDP Ports, and Banner Grabbing) were done using a port scan.  Port 
scans can be used against any computer regardless of the operating system.  The 
remaining tests were done from the Windows Enumeration scan and are only effective 
against the Microsoft Windows operating System.  “TCP Ports” indicates the number of 
Transmission Control Protocol ports that SuperScan found open on the victim computer, 
and “UDP Ports” indicates the number of User Datagram ports.  “Banner Grabbing” 
indicates additional data about both types of open ports, including information about the 
services running such as “Http 1.1” or “Microsoft IIS 5.0”.  “Name Table” indicates that 
SuperScan could discover the names, such as Inside, associated with the victim computer.  
“MAC Address” indicates SuperScan could discover the victim computer’s unique Media 
Access Control address.  “Workstation Type” indicates that SuperScan could determine 
what operating system the victim computer was running.  “Users” indicates that 
SuperScan could provide the names of all the victim computer’s users along with data 
such as the last time the user logged on, when the user last changed his password, and 
when the current password expires.  “Groups” indicates that SuperScan could provide the 
names of all the groups on the victim computer and users associated with each group.  
“RPC Endpoints” indicates that SuperScan could determine information about the 
Remote Procedure Call pointers.  “Password Policy” indicates that SuperScan could 
determine the password policy of the victim computer such as how many incorrect logon 
attempts are allowed and the minimum password length.  “Shares” indicates that 
SuperScan could find at least one file or drive being “shared” by the Windows operating 
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system of the victim computer.  “Time of Day” indicates that SuperScan could determine 
the system time on the victim computer.  “Logon Sessions” indicates that SuperScan 
could determine who was logged on to the victim computer, how long they have been 
logged on, and how long they have been idle.  “Drives” indicates that SuperScan could 
discover the drive letters, such as “C”, currently being used on the victim computer.  
“Trusted Domains” indicates that SuperScan could determine what domains the victim 
computer belonged to.  “Services” indicates that SuperScan could determine what 
services were currently installed on the victim computer and whether or not the service 
was currently running.   
Table 1 summarizes the results of testing, where "yes" means that SuperScan 
succeeded in its reconnaissance (and thus the protection mechanism failed).  Analysis of 
McAfee Entercept’s performance during this phase is in section B.9 of this chapter, and 
analysis of Cisco Security Agent’s performance in section C.9.  SuperScan’s complete 
reports are attached as Appendix B. 
  





TCP Ports Yes – 10 Yes - 10 Yes – 5  Yes - 10 
UDP Ports Yes – 3 Yes – 3 Yes – 1  Yes - 3 
Banner Grabbing Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Name Table Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MAC Address Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workstation 
Type 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Users Yes Yes Yes No 
Groups Yes Yes Yes No 
RPC Endpoints Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Password Policy Yes Yes Yes No 
Shares Yes Yes Yes No 
Time Of Day Yes Yes Yes No 
Logon Sessions Yes Yes Yes No 
Drives Yes Yes Yes No 
Trusted Domains Yes Yes Yes No 
Services  Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 1. Reconnaissance Phase Results 
 
B. TESTING EXPLOITS AGAINST MCAFEE ENTERCEPT 
1. Remote Phase 
McAfee Entercept prevented 11 of our 12 remote exploit attempts.  The only 
failure was for Metasploit’s MSrpc_dcom_ms03_026 exploit, using the “add user” 
payload.  Using this payload we were able to add an administrator level account onto the 
victim machine.  We are unsure as to why this occurred: Entercept blocked "Core 
Impacts" use of the same exploit.  We ran the test again with the same exploit and a 
different payload (Win32_bind); this time Entercept blocked the exploit.  We then ran the 
test a third time, this time again with the “add user” payload, and exploited the victim 
computer.  The exploit was then run again at the highest protection level.  This time 
Entercept could block the exploit by blocking access to the command prompt. 
Another exploit, “IIS IDA-IDQ”, was unable to  execute, but the management 
server did not record any alerts.  We are unsure as to why this occurred.  In our testing 
against an unprotected system the exploit succeeded. 
The exploits used and the alerts generated by host agents are listed below in Table 
2.  A “N” in the FN, or False Negative, column indicates that the exploit was blocked by 
the Entercept agent; a “Y” indicates a false negative, or missed attack.  All columns  
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containing a “Y” also contain a second “Y” or “N”; indicating the result of a second test 
performed at the highest security level.  Alerts generated during only the highest tested 
are marked with as “(low)”. 
 Tool Exploit FN  Alerts 
1 CI IIS CGI Filename Decode N 1 IIS Directory Transversal and 
Code Execution 
1 IIS Remote Command Execution 
1 IIS Directory Traversal 
2 CI IIS Unicode  N  1 IIS Directory Traversal and 
Code Execution 
3 CI IIS IDA-IDQ N 0 
4 CI SQL Server Hello  N 1 Generic Buffer Overflow 
5 CI MSRPC DCOM N 1 svchost Buffer Overflow (RPC 
DCOM) 
6 CI SQL Server  
CAN-2002-0649 
N 1 Generic Buffer Overflow 
7 CI IIS ASN.1 Big String SpNeGo N 1 Generic Buffer Overflow 
8 CI MSRPC LSASS Buffer 
Overflow 
N 1 Generic Buffer Overflow 
9 CI iis_nsiislog_post N 1 IIS envelope modified by IIS 
Process (Medium) 
10 CI iis50_printer_overflow N 1 IIS printer extension request 
11 CI Iis50_webdav_ntdll N 2 IIS webdav Buffer Overflow 
12 CI Msrpc_dcom_ms03_026 Y  N 1 CMD Tool Accessed (Low) 
 
Table 2. McAfee Entercept Remote Phase. 
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FN = False Negative  
CI = Core Impact MS = Metasploit 
2. Email Phase 
McAfee Entercept prevented only 2 of our 12 email exploits.  False negatives 
included Iworm.navidad.b, which began emailing itself through our email server to the 
email accounts listed in Inside’s address book, and Iworm.mydoom.g, which eliminated 
the user’s ability to view the task manager.   
When the exploits were retested against the highest level of protection, Entercept 
still failed to block any of them.  Although Entercept generated a “new startup program 
creation” alert for many of them during this retest, it did not prevent most of them from 
remaining persistent after restart, including Iworm.navidad.b which set out 73 emails in 
less then a minute, and Iworm.Loveletter which prevented the host agent from starting 
again after restart.  The exploits used and the alerts generated are listed below in Table 3. 
 
 Exploit FN  Alerts 
1 Iworm.lovegate.i Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
2 Iworm.Loveletter Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
3 Iworm.Klez.h N 3 Agent Shielding File Modification 
(Shutdown attempt) 
1 System drive Executable Modification 
(Medium) 
4 Iworm.Moodown Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
5 Iworm.Navidad.b Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
6 Iworm.Netsky.d Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
7 Worm.win32.Chainsaw.a Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
8 Worm.win32.Donk.c Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
9 Backdoor.SdBot.aa Y     Y 0 
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 Exploit FN  Alerts 
10 Win2k.inta.1688 N 1 System File Modification in Root Drive 
1 System Drive Executable Modification 
11 Iworm.Radix. Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
12 Iworm.Mydoom.g Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
Table 3. McAfee Entercept Email Phase. 
 
FN = False Negative 
3. Web Phase 
 McAfee Entercept prevented all 12 of our 12 web page exploits for our first test.  
In the first test we selected the Internet Explorer download option “run this program from 
its current location”; Entercept does not allow this option, and all our attempts were 
blocked by the host agent.  While this rule  blocked our exploit attempts, any legitimate 
attempts to execute non-malicious code in this manner would also be blocked.  For the 
second test we selected the “save this program to disk” option.  Entercept then prevented 
only 4 of our 12 web page exploits.  One exploit, Iworm.mydoom.h, first deleted itself 
and then began emailing itself to addresses such as “support@microsoft.com”.  Another 
exploit, win32.lash.d, a virus, spawned over 900 processes, each of which then displayed 
a vulgar message to the screen.  A third exploit, Willow.2013, actually generated an alert 
with the management server, however its behaviors still met our qualification as a false 
negative.  Though the alert it generated allows the administrator some warning that the 
exploit occurred, Entercept was unable to prevent all of the damage caused by the exploit.  
When the successful exploits were retested against the highest level of protection, 
Entercept still failed to block any more of them.  Although it generated alerts for several, 
the exploits still met our criteria of a false negative. The exploits used and the alerts 




 Exploit FN1 FN2 Alerts 
1 Netbus Trojan  N N      1 Netbus Trojan Installation 
(Medium) 
2 Trojan.Win32.virtualroot N N 1 System Drive Executable 
Modification 
1 System modification in root drive 
3 IISWorm.CodeGreen.a N N 3 IIS CodeRed idq.dll Buffer 
Overflow 
3 IIS %u (UTF) Encoding (M) 
4 Willow.2013 N Y     Y 1 IE Envelop NTVDM Execution 
5 Win2k.Stream N Y     Y 0 
6 Win32.Cabanas.b N Y     Y 1 System Executable Writing (low) 
7 Win32.Ghost.1667 N Y     Y 1 System Executable Writing (low) 
8 Win32.HLLO.Zori N N 1 System Drive Executable 
Modification 
1 System File Modification in Root 
Drive 
9 Win32.Lash.d N Y     Y 0 
10 Win32.Matrix.Ordy.a N Y     Y 0 
11 Win32.Redemption.b N Y     Y 1 System Executable Writing (low) 
12 Iworm.Mydoom.h N Y     Y 0 
Table 4. McAfee Entercept Web Phase 
 
FN1 = False Negative “run this program from its current location” option 
FN2 = False Negative “save this program to disk” option 
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4. Disk Phase 
McAfee Entercept did not stop a single disk exploit; all 12 exploits succeeded.  
One exploit, I-worm.alanis, added a number of files to the hard drive; each file contained 
another copy of the virus that was executed if the file was opened.  Another exploit, 
Worm2, simply displayed an error message to the screen every time the exploit was 
executed and every time the computer was restarted thereafter.  Although I-
worm.bagle.at’s behavior generated an alert, it still met our criteria as a false negative.   
When the exploits were retested against the highest level of protection Entercept 
did  block two of them, Worm1 and Worm2.   The exploits used and the alerts generated 
are listed in Table 5. 
 
 Exploit FN Alerts 
1 IIS-Worm.IIS Worm Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low)  
2 Worm.Win32.Lovesan.a Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
3 Worm.Win32.Muma.C Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
4 Worm1 Y     N 1 CMD Tool Access (low) 
5 Worm2 Y     N 1 CMD Tool Access (low) 
6 Win32.Small.2280 Y     Y 0 
7 Iworm.Aliz Y     Y 0 
8 Worm.win32.sasser.b Y     Y 1 New startup program creation (low) 
9 Worm.win32.welchia.g Y     Y 0 
10 I-worm.bagle.at Y     Y 1 Entercept Agent Shielding – File 
Modification 
11 Trojan.call911 Y     Y 0 
12 I-worm.alanis Y     Y 0  
Table 5. McAfee Entercept Email Phase 
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FN = False Negative 
5. Installation/Un-installation  
Installation of both the management server and the individual host agents for 
Entercept was simple and straightforward.  The user was required to install the 
management server, host agent, and a management console on the system serving as the 
management server.  This installation was quick and relatively easy.  All three programs 
were installed individually using a single compact disk (CD).  The host agent was 
installed on the victim computer using the same CD.   
However, we ran into several problems during the un-installation of this product.  
Those problems are discussed in detail in chapter 4 section E.1. 
6. Manageability/Usability 
All Entercept management activities were accomplished via the management 
console.  It can only be run locally on the computer it is installed on, and is the only way 
to manage the individual host agents.  Users are not notified of any alerts generated by 
their host agent.  The alerts generated by the host agents are reported to the management 
server and can be viewed using the management console.  Unfortunately, if the server is 
left unattended no one will know that about alerts that have been generated.  When an 
exploit contains a known signature, Entercept can identify that exploit by name.  
Otherwise, Entercept alerts contain information on what malicious behavior was 
attempted and what files or processes the behavior was attempted on. 
The management console is simple and easy to use.  It is easy to access and 
allows all host agents to be quickly and easily managed.  The intrusion-prevention system 
and firewall can be controlled independently from one another, and have three possible 
settings: disabled, warning mode, and protection mode.  In warning mode, alerts are still 
generated and sent to the management server but no action is taken.  In protection mode 
alerts are generated and sent to the management server and protective action is taken. 
Entercept also allows the administrator to set a protection policy.  These policies 
determine the level of protection provided by the Entercept agents.  Policies can be 
assigned to individual agents or groups of agents.  Switching between policies is easy; 
however, there is no clear indicator of which policy is in effect for a given system.  This 
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was not a problem for us because we had only two hosts.  However, on a large 
heterogeneous network this could be onerous to manage.  Entercept provides five pre-
defined protection policies and also allows the administrator to create his own.  The pre-
defined policies are shown in Table 6 below.  Our testing was conducted with level 2 and 
level 3 policies.  All exploits were first tested at level 2; all false negatives were then 







Level 1 Prevent Ignore Ignore Ignore 
Preparing for Level 2 Prevent Log Ignore Ignore 
Level 2 Prevent Prevent Ignore Ignore 
Preparing for Level 3 Prevent Prevent Log Ignore 
Level 3 Prevent Prevent Prevent Log 
Table 6. Entercept Protection Policies (McAfee 2005) 
 
Host agents listed in the management server were given the same name as the 
computer they resided on.  Over the course of our testing we had to restore the victim 
computer to its original state numerous times.  Each time an image was restored and the 
agent was reloaded onto the computer, the management console reported it as a new host, 
even though the name was the same.  To ensure there were no naming conflicts in the 
management server’s logs, Entercept automatically numbered occurrences, as with 
Inside[1]).. 
7. False Positives 
A false positive was recorded repeatedly during our testing at level 2 protection 
every time the management console was started.  It reported that “explorer.exe” was 
attempting to modify the management server.  Two more false positives were recorded 
during our testing at level 3 protection: when the user attempts to access either the 
35 
Command Prompt or any of the “Administrator Tools” available through the Microsoft 
Windows Control Panel.   
8. Throughput  
The McAfee Entercept agents had no noticeable effect on their computers’ 
performance.  However, the management console and management server do require 
significant computing resources.  We recommend that the computer hosting the 
management server be used only for that purpose, and should not be responsible for 
hosting any other services on the network and should not also serve as someone’s desktop 
computer.  This helps to ensure that other network resources are not impacted during an 
attack or other times when the management server is otherwise under a heavy load.  It 
also allows the management server’s own protection agent to function at a high level of 
protection so it itself is not exploited. 
9. Analysis 
Overall we were not very impressed with the performance of McAfee Entercept.  
During our remote phase of testing, Entercept blocked all but one exploit we attempted.  
Unfortunately, the exploit Entercept missed created an administrator level user account 
on the victim computer.  Once the attacker has access to an administrator level account, 
he or she no longer needs to use exploits, but can use legitimate services such as telnet to 
login to the system remotely.  Additionally, this exploit, MSrpc_dcom_ms03_026, is one 
of the most publicized and well-known exploits. Although Entercept blocked Core 
Impact’s efforts to use the same exploit, it did not prevent Metasploit from successfully 
executing the exploit.   
Entercept stopped only 8 of 36 malicious code exploits used in the disk, email, 
and web phases.  While 10 of those 36 were viruses, which Entercept did not claim to 
protect against, the remaining 26 were not.  We cannot explain why so many were 
missed.  Some of the behaviors, such as mass emailing everyone in the users address 
book, are well-known and understood worm behaviors.  Additionally, many of the 
successful exploits were persistent, continuing to run even after the computer was 
restarted.  Our tests at level 3 showed that Entercept does prevent some of these efforts 
from becoming persistent, however. 
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We believe McAfee Entercept did a poor job fulfilling the claims and promises of 
its marketing materials, outlined in chapter 3 section C.1.  Though it did prevent almost 
all of the remote exploits, its performance against malicious-code exploits was 
unsatisfactory. 
McAfee Entercept did not claim to provide any protection from reconnaissance 
attempts, but we tested its ability anyway.  This was done because Cisco Security Agent 
did provide claims about its ability to thwart reconnaissance efforts and we decided to 
also test McAfee’s ability to thwart these attempts.  As Table 1 shows, it was 
unsuccessful at detecting reconnaissance.  This information obtained included things like 
the user names, password policies, and services currently running on the computer, 
including a service named “enterceptAgent”.  Learning exactly what protection services a 
victim computer is running is very valuable as it makes it easier to launch a successful 
attack. 
 
C. TESTING EXPLOITS AGAINST THE CISCO SECURITY AGENT  
1. Remote Phase 
The Cisco Security Agent stopped all 12 remote exploits (see Table 7).  However, 
the SQL Server CAN-2002-0649 exploit caused the SQL service to crash; the service had 
to be restarted by a user.  A second exploit, IIS ASN.1 Big String SpNeGo, caused the 
operating system to crash; the user then had to reboot the computer.  Although the 
exploits were stopped, these crashes would cause at least a temporary denial of service.  
 
   Tool Exploit FN Alerts 
1 CI IIS CGI Filename Decode N 11 The process attempted to receive data 
1 The process has triggered to many log 
records, messages will be suppressed for 10 
minutes. 
2 CI IIS Unicode  N 1 The process attempted to receive data 
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 Tool Exploit FN Alerts 
3 CI IIS IDA-IDQ N 1 Self-modifying or buffer overflow code  
4 CI SQL Server Hello  N 1 Self-modifying or buffer overflow code 
5 CI MSRPC DCOM N 1 Self-modifying or buffer overflow code 
1 Current Application Attempted to execute 
new application 
6 CI SQL Server CAN-2002-
0649 
N 2 The process attempted to access   
1Self-modifying or buffer overflow code 
7 CI IIS ASN.1 Big String 
SpNeGo 
N 1 Process attempted to call exception 
handling routing  
8 CI MSRPC LSASS Buffer 
Overflow 
N 1 The process attempted to communicate 
9 MS iis_nsiislog_post N 0 
10 MS iis50_printer_overflow N 1 The application attempted to receive data 
11 MS iis50_webdav_ntdll N 1 Self-modifying or buffer overflow code 
12 MS Msrpc_dcom_ms03_026 N 1 Self-modifying or buffer overflow code 
Table 7. Cisco Security Agent Remote Phase 
 
CI = Core Impact MS = Metasploit FN = False Negative 
2. Email Phase 
The Cisco Security Agent stopped 8 of 12 email exploits (see Table 8).  Before 
any of the exploits were executed, the Cisco Security Agent provided a warning that the 
“recently downloaded program may be dangerous” and asked if we still wished to run it.  
We answered yes and were presented with a challenge.  The challenge required us to type 
in four upper or lowercase letters to match a visual pattern, but once we answered the 
challenge, we could execute the downloaded program.  Since Cisco Security Agent 
displays this message for all untrusted traffic, regardless of whether it was malicious or 
benign, we deemed this to be a fair test of the product. That is, had the product only given 
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this warning for malicious traffic, we would not have declared it a false negative.  Since 
Cisco Security Agent does differentiate between trusted and untrusted traffic we do not 
believe this is a failure on the part of the product.  Traffic is declared untrusted if it is not 
signed by a known or trusted party.  The Cisco Security Agent keeps a log of all 
untrusted programs installed on the host system. 
False negatives included Iworm.Navidad.b and Iworm.Mydoom.g whose behavior 
is discussed in section B.2 of this chapter.  Although Iworm.Navidad.b generated three 
alerts, the agent did not prevent it from sending itself to the other entries in Inside’s 
address book, even at the highest security level Cisco Security agent did not prevent any 
of the exploits previously identified as false negatives.   
  
 Exploit FN Alerts 
1 Iworm.lovegate.i N 2 The process attempted to write 
2 Iworm.Loveletter N 10 The process attempted to write 
3 Iworm.Klez.h N 1 The process attempted to write 
4 Iworm.Moodown N 11 The process attempted to write 
5 Iworm.Navidad.b Y     Y 3 The process attempted to write 
6 Iworm.Netsky.d N 2 The process attempted to write 
1 Self modifying or buffer overflow code 
7 Worm.win32.Chainsaw.a Y     Y 0 
8 Worm.win32.Donk.c N 2 The process attempted to write 
9 Backdoor.SdBot.aa N 4 The process attempted to write 
10 Win2k.inta.1688 Y     Y 0 
11 Iworm.Radix. N 2 The process attempted to write 
12 Iworm.Mydoom.g Y     Y 6 The process attempted to write 
Table 8. Cisco Security Agent Email Phase 
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FN = False Negative 
3. Web Phase 
We first executed the exploits using the Internet Explorer option “run this 
program from its current location” option.  The Cisco Security Agent stopped only 2 of 
the 12 exploits (see Table 9).  For the second test using the “save this program to disk” 
option, Cisco Security Agent again stopped 2 of the 12 exploits.  During both tests, the 
Cisco Security Agent warned that the “recently download program may be dangerous” 
and asked if we still wanted to run it.  One false negative, the Netbus Trojan, allowed us 
to gain control of Inside from Outside, our attacking computer.  With this control we 
were able to send messages to Inside, control the mouse, and open and close the CD-
ROM.  Although the exploit was not persistent after restart, it gave the attacker control 
until the victim machine was restarted.   
When retested at the highest security level, Cisco Security agent did prevent two 
of the exploits previously identified as false negatives.  The alerts generated during the 
second test have been omitted from Table 9 as they were the same as those generated 
during the first; the only difference was in how many alerts were generated. 
 
 Exploit FN1 FN2 Alerts 
1 Netbus Trojan  Y     Y Y     Y 3 The process attempted to write 
2 Trojan.Win32.virtualroot Y     Y Y     Y 1 The process attempted to write 
3 IIS-Worm.CodeGreen.a Y     Y Y     Y 1 The process attempted to received 
data 
1 Self Modifying or buffer overflow 
code 
4 Willow.2013 N Y     N 0 
5 Win2k.Stream Y     Y Y     Y 0 
6 Win32.Cabanas.b Y     Y Y     Y 0 
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 Exploit FN1 FN2 Alerts 
7 Win32.Ghost.1667 Y     N Y     N 11 The process attempted to write 
8 Win32.HLLO.Zori N N 2 The process attempted to write 
9 Win32.Lash.d Y     Y Y     Y 0 
10 Win32.Matrix.Ordy.a Y     Y Y     Y 0 
11 Win32.Redemption.b Y     Y Y     Y 11 The process attempted to write 
12 Iworm.Mydoom.u Y     Y N 1 The process attempted to write 
Table 9. Cisco Security Agent Web Phase 
 
FN1 = False Negative “run this program from its current location” option 
FN2 = False Negative “save this program to disk” option. 
4. Disk Phase 
The Cisco Security Agent  stopped 5 of our 12 disk exploits (see Table 10).  In all 
12 cases when we attempted to execute the exploits, the agent warned that the program 
executing from removable media was potentially dangerous and asked if we still wanted 
to run it.  False negatives included Iworm.Aliz, which began emailing itself to everyone 
in Inside’s address book, and I-worm.Alanis whose behavior is discussed in section B.4.  
When tested again at the highest level of protection, the Cisco Security Agent did prevent 
one of the exploits, Trojan.call911, from executing.  
 
 Exploit FN Alerts 
1 IIS-Worm.IIS Worm N 0 
2 Worm.Win32.Lovesan.a Y     Y 0 
3 Worm.Win32.Muma.C Y     Y 4 The process attempted to write 
4 Worm1 Y     Y 0 
5 Worm2 Y     Y 0 
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 Exploit FN Alerts 
6 Win32.Small.2280 N 0 
7 Iworm.Aliz Y     Y 0 
8 Worm.win32.sasser.b N 1 The process attempted to write 
9 Worm.win32.welchia.g N 1 The process attempted to write 
10 I-worm.bagle.at N 1 The process attempted to write 
11 Trojan.call911 Y     N 1 The process attempted to read (low) 
12 I-worm.alanis Y     Y 3 The process attempted to write 
Table 10. Cisco Security Agent Disk Phase 
 
5. Installation/Un-installation  
The installation of the Cisco Security Agent was more difficult and time-
consuming than the installation of McAfee Entercept.  To install the management server, 
we also had to install some components of Cisco Works, a virtual private network 
program.  The protection agent for the host was automatically installed along with the 
management server.  The installation of Cisco Works and the management server took 
approximately one hour.  For most of that hour the installation proceeded without any 
human intervention. Problems encountered during installation are discussed in chapter 4 
section E.2. 
Installation of the agents was easy.  Instead of requiring the administrator to 
individually install the host agents using a CD, Cisco Security Agent allows the 
administrator to create agent kits.  These kits allow the administrator to tailor which 
groups the new host agent will join and which predefined rule modules it will enforce.  
The agent kits are then created and “published”, after which they can then be accessed by 
any computer connected to the network.  To install the agent, the administrator sends the 
web address of the agent kit to the host users via email; the user clicks on the link, 
downloads, and runs the program.  The installation proceeds without any other user 
intervention, the computer automatically reboots, and the host agent automatically 
registers with the management server. 
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Uninstallation of the Cisco Security Agent was easy.  We were able to quickly 
uninstall the host agents, management server, and Cisco Works at the conclusion of our 
testing. 
6. Manageability/Usability  
The management center is accessed using Cisco Works as a portal.  Any computer 
connected on the network can reach Cisco Works on the management server allowing the 
administrator to use any computer to receive alerts and manage the host agents.  
Should the administrator choose to allow it, the user can perform some minimal 
management of the agent residing on his or her computer.  This allows a trusted user to 
select the appropriate security level (high, medium, low, or off) of their host agent.  
However, the administrator is only notified if the user sets the security level to off, not if 
the level is lowered to medium or low.  All users can view the alerts generated by the 
agent residing on their computer. We considered this a distinct advantage of Cisco’s 
Security Agent over that of McAfee’s Entercept, particularly for remote users not 
constantly connected to the management server.  The user is notified of these alerts via a 
taskbar icon of a red flag that begins to “wave” when an alert is recorded.  These alerts 
are also sent to the management server.   
The warnings generated by the host agents about potentially dangerous files that 
have recently been downloaded could quickly become annoying.  Replying to the query 
and answering the challenge question is not difficult, but it does take time.  While the 
warning is a valuable reminder, especially to novice users, some users may disable or 
ignore security to avoid these warnings and challenges. 
The management server is easy to use and to learn.  The alerts generated by the 
host agents are easy to manage and contained detailed forensics information.  Although 
the management server cannot identify the exploit specifically, it does provide 
information on what rule generated the alert, what behavior the exploit attempted, and 
what processes or files the exploit attempted to perform this behavior on.  It also provides 




7. False Positives 
Several false positives were encountered in our testing of Cisco Security Agent.  
Attempting to open the Microsoft Windows “Control Panel” via the “Windows Toolbar” 
resulted in one such false positive.  Also, while using the Microsoft Outlook Email client 
and clicking on the “Send/Receive” email button on Inside resulted in a false positive on 
Outside.  To send or receive email, we had to disable the security on the computer 
hosting the email server. 
8.  Throughput 
The Cisco Security Agent’s protective agent had no noticeable effect on the host 
computer’s throughput.  However, the management server required significant computing 
resources.  We recommend the computer hosting the management server function as a 
dedicated management server.  The reasons are the same as those outlined for McAfee 
Entercept in section B.8. 
9. Analysis 
Overall, we thought the Cisco Security Agent performed fairly well.  During the 
reconnaissance phase of testing, we were able to determine what ports were open, the 
RPC endpoints, and several other pieces of information, but our efforts to access most 
information were thwarted.  The Cisco Security Agent also prevented all 12 of our 
remote phase exploits.  Although two of those exploits resulted in at least a temporary 
loss of services on the victim computer, full execution of the exploits was  blocked. 
The Cisco Security agent also stopped 17 of our 36 malicious code exploits.  
While this is far from perfect, it did stop more then twice the number of exploits that 
McAfee Entercept did.  Additionally, only a few of the exploits were persistent after 
restart.  Cisco Security Agent prevented the exploits from rewriting the system registries 
and adding new files, actions that if performed would have allowed the exploits to 
continue to run after a restart.  However, the Cisco Security Agent provided poor 
protection against Trojan Horses.  For example the Netbus Trojan is not a new exploit, 
yet it did not detect it. 
Although we were not testing specifically for false positives, the two we 
discovered were important.  Although the Cisco Security Agent allows the administrator 
to create, modify, and delete the rules being enforced by the host agent, this process 
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should be avoided whenever possible.  Changing the rules to prevent these false positives 
could have unforeseen consequences that leave the system less protected. 
We believe Cisco Security Agent did an acceptable job fulfilling the claims and 
promises its own marketing materials made, outlined in chapter 3, section C.2.  Although 
it did not prevent all  our exploits, it did an excellent job minimizing the damage of those 
that were successful.  Additionally, its ability to thwart reconnaissance efforts and remote 










A. HOST-BASED INTRUSION PREVENTION SYSTEMS 
Overall, host-based intrusion-prevention systems appear useful and worth the added 
expense.   They allow administrators to optimize protection for each host on the network.  
They support de-parameterization (a reduced dependence on placing security measures at 
the perimeter of the network to provide its security) and the creation of ad-hoc, dynamic 
networks where perimeters are often changing or otherwise ill-defined.  The “tighter” 
security perimeter deployed around each host prevents attacks by insiders and local users 
that many network-based systems would miss. 
Most host-based systems perform inspections at the kernel level to prevent the 
attacker from using insertion or evasion attacks against the protection agents.  Exploit 
tactics such as improper fragmentation and malformed packets will not affect a kernel-
level inspection.  Additionally, tactics for subverting signature-based network-based 
systems such as space padding will not effect an inspection based on the behavior of the 
application.  To subvert a system, attackers must discover its behavioral rules and design 
an exploit that does not violate those rules.  Since the protection can be tailored to each 
host, the attacker may have to create multiple custom exploits. 
Neither of the products we evaluated prevented every exploit.  But they will 
definitely provide better protection against insertion and evasion attacks, better protection 
against some exploits with no known signature, and better protection against local and 




A secondary goal of this thesis was to provide the Department of Defense with a 
recommendation about whether to purchase these products.  We base this 
recommendation on both the products’ performance in the tests individually and by their 
performance against one another.  While neither system is perfect, we believe that Cisco 
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Security Agent’s performance exceeded that of McAfee Entercept, and we recommend it 
alone. 
 McAfee Entercept performed poorly during four of our five phases of testing.  In 
the remote phase Entercept did perform well, though it still allowed an older well-known 
exploit to execute successfully at medium security.  Even at the highest security level, the 
alert generated did not properly warn the administrator of what had happened.  One of 
Entercept’s best features is its ability to identify threats using its database of known 
attack signatures, yet in this case the signature was not identified.  
If future versions of McAfee Entercept correct the deficiencies noted in our tests 
and support more hosts per management server, our negative recommendation should be 
reconsidered. 
We do recommend Cisco Security Agent for deployment by the Department of 
Defense.  Although its performance during the web phase of testing was poor, and the 
performance during the disk phase was only marginal, the performance during the 
reconnaissance, remote, and email phases was excellent.  Additionally, even when 
exploits were successful the damaged caused was often minimal; many times simply 
restarting the exploited computer eliminated any effects caused by the exploit.  Also, the 
ability of the management server to manage up to 100,000 host agents will allow 
flexibility and scalability for both current and future networks. 
A successful deployment of the Cisco Security Agent will require significant 
time, effort, and resources, but we believe such a deployment is worthwhile for important 
computer systems.  For this to succeed, Cisco must provide assistance during the initial 
setup and configuration to ensure the proper rule sets are selected for enforcement.  
Careful planning and configuration is essential to reduce the number of false positives 
and false negatives. 
 
C. PENETRATION TESTING  
Decisions about purchase of information security systems should never be made 
without careful evaluation and testing.  As this work demonstrated, simply trusting the 
claims made by the manufacturer is not enough.  While this research tested only two 
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host-based intrusion-prevention systems, the configuration and procedures we used could 
be easily replicated to test any number of products.  Our research was not especially 
difficult or expensive.  The computers we used were former lab machines that had been 
retired but still continued to function; our software was either an evaluation copy, open-
source copy, or a licensed version.  The configuration and installation of the products was 
accomplished with little difficulty.  Without much difficulty we obtained an excellent 
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APPENDIX: TESTING PROCEDURES 
A. REMOTE EXPLOIT PROCEDURE 
1. Load Core Impact 
2. Create New Workspace 
3. Add new host, use IP Address of victim machine 
4. Click on “Attack and Penetration” 
5. Click on the “Advance Tab” 
6. Double click on “Exploits” 
7. Double click on “Remote” 
8. Click on desired exploit, using mouse drag it over to the victim’s icon and 
release 
9. Wait for exploit to complete 
10. Check management server for alerts 
11. Repeat for next exploit 
12. Restart as necessary to ensure services on victim machine are running. 
13. After completing the Core Impact exploits open the Metasploit 
framework. 
14. Type “use X” with X being your exploit name. 
15. Type “set PAYLOAD X” with X being your payload name 
16. Type “show options”  
17. Fill in all required fields by typing “set VALUE X” (VALUE is the 
required field, X is the field’s variable) 
18. Type “show targets” 
19. Type “set TARGET X” where X is the target number selected from the list 
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20. Type “exploit” 
21. Wait for exploit to complete 
22. Check Management server for alerts 
23. Repeat for next exploit. 
 
B. EMAIL EXPLOIT PROCEDURE 
1. Ensure your chosen email server and client are properly configured 
2. Open Email Client on Outside 
3. Select Create New Mail 
4. Attach Malicious Code 
5. Fill in subject and body as required by your testing 
6. Send to victim 
7. Open email client on victim 
8. View Task manager to monitor processes  
9. Open attachment 
10. Run attachment 
11. Wait one – two minutes or until processes stop, monitor for noticeable 
behaviors 
12. Check management server for alerts 
13. Repeat for next exploit. 
 
C. DISK EXPLOIT PROCEDURE 
1. Insert exploit disk into victim machine 
2. Double click on “My computer” 
3. Double click on “3.5” Floppy Drive” 
4. Open Task M anager to monitor processes 
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5. Double click on exploit 
6. Wait one – two minutes or until processes stop, monitor for noticeable 
behaviors 
7. Check management server for alerts 
8. Repeat for next exploit 
 
D. WEB PHASE EXPLOIT PROCEDURE 
1. Open Victim Computer’s Web Browser 
2. Browse to the page containing you malicious code links 
3. Click on the exploit to download 
4. Select the “run this program from its current location” option 
5. Execute the exploit 
6. Wait one – two minutes or until processes stop, monitor for noticeable 
behaviors 
7. Check management server for alerts 
8. Repeat for next exploit 
9. When finished select first exploit again 
10. Select the “save this program to disk” option 
11. Execute the exploit 
12. Wait one – two minutes or until processes stop, monitor for noticeable 
behaviors 
13. Check management server for alerts 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
53 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Robert Lemos and Dawn Kawamoto, Sasser Variants Pose Greater Danger, 
Tech Republic May 4, 2004, http://techrepublic.com.com/5100-1035_11-5205182.html# 
(28 May 2005) 
2. Nigel Beighton Early Alerting – The key to proactive security, May 2004, 
Technews Home 
http://securitysa.com/article.asp?pklArticleID=2974&pklIssueID=32&pklCategoryID=11  
(22 May 2005) 




4. The Internet of Today…  and Tomorrow, Symantec (Small Business), 
http://www.symantec.com/region/in/smallbiz/library/tomorrow.html (22 May 2005) 
5. Gary Sevounts, Distribution Utilities and Information Security, Symantec 
(Power and Energy) October 1, 2004, 
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/industry/power/article.cfm?articleid=4743&EID=
0 (22 May 22, 2005) 
6. Jay Beale, James Foster, and Jeffrey Posluns, Snort 2.0 Intrusion Detection 
(Rockland: Syngress 2003)  
7. Paul Proctor The Practical Intrusion Detection Handbook (Upper Saddle River: 
Prentice Hall 2001) 8 
8. Internet/Network Security “Stateful Inspection” About, 
http://netsecurity.about.com/cs/generalsecurity/g/def_stateful.htm (May 22, 2005) 
9. Ellen Messmer, Security Debate Rages, Network World, October 2003, 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2003/1006ids.html (May 22, 2005) 
54 
10. William Stallings, Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards, 
second edition, (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003) 
11. Shai Rubin, Somesh Jha, Barton Miller, Automatic Generation and Analysis 
of NIDS Attacks, ACSAC, 2004, http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~shai/59final.pdf (22 May 
2005) 
12. Thomas Ptacek, Timothy Newsham, “Insertion Evasion and Denial of 
Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection, January 1998, Secure Networks Inc, 
http://www.insecure.org/stf/secnet_ids/secnet_ids.html (22 May 2005) 
13. Global Information Grid, National Security Agency : Central Security Service 
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/gig.cfm?MenuID=10.3.2.2  (24 May 2005) 
14. Entercept 5.0 Evaluation Guide 
15. Cisco Security Agent Version 4.5 Data Sheet 
16. Phizz0r Hackers Playground August 2001 
<http://www.hackersplayground.com>  (March 2005) 
17. VX Heavens November 1999 <http://vx.netlux.org/>  (March 2005) 
55 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Neil Rowe 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. J.D. Fulp 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Charles Herring 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Greg Abelar 
Cisco Systems 
San Jose, California 
 
7. Keith Labbe 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
